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1 Introduction
Quantum information theory has by now become to a large extent a new
orthodoxy in the foundations of quantum mechanics. It is sometimes further
claimed that the information–theoretic approach brings out the so–called
“futility” of the long-standing debates over the interpretations of quantum
mechanics.1 A major conceptual tool enhancing the information–theoretic
approach is the remarkable theorem by Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (2003,
CBH henceforth) according to which quantum theory can be characterized
by three information–theoretic principles: no signaling, no broadcasting and
no (unconditionally secure) bit commitment (NO BIT henceforth). The aim
of this paper is to examine the information–theoretic approach to quantum
mechanics focusing on Bub’s (2004, 2005) recent analysis of it and some of
its implications.
On the basis of the above three principles of the CBH theorem, Bub
(2004, p. 242; see also 2005) argues for the following three theses:
1. A quantum theory is best understood as a theory about
the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer
as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical
waves or particles.2
2. Given the three information–theoretic constraints, any me-
chanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an ac-
count of the measuring instruments that reveal these phe-
nomena must be empirically equivalent to a quantum theory.
3. Assuming the information–theoretic constraints are in fact
satisfied in our world, no mechanical theory of quantum phe-
nomena that includes an account of measurement interac-
tions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics
at the fundamental level then becomes the representation
and manipulation of information.
In his recent paper in this journal, Bub (2005) depicts the philosophical sig-
nificance of the CBH theorem as analogous to Einstein’s shift from the con-
structive view of theories—attributed to Lorentz and FitzGerald—towards
1For such a claim see Fuchs (2002); For a response—Hagar (2003)
2By information Bub means information in the physical sense as measured, e. g., in
quantum mechanics by the von Neumann entropy.
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the principle view of theories in the context of the special theory of rela-
tivity.3 His idea is that the distinction between constructive theories and
theories of principle is suitable to characterize the difference between the
information–theoretic approach and all other interpretations of quantum
theory. As the above theses show, Bub believes that if, indeed, the three
information–theoretic principles of the CBH theorem hold in our world, then
no constructive theory for quantum phenomena is possible that yields differ-
ent predictions than those of quantum theory.
Bub’s three theses have very important implications regarding the un-
derstanding of quantum mechanics and the future direction in which the re-
search at the foundations of the theory will go. We agree with Bub’s second
thesis (that any constructive theory for quantum phenomena which satisfies
the three information–theoretic principles of the CBH theorem is empirically
indistinguishable from quantum theory). Nevertheless, here we wish to ex-
amine Bub’s approach and present an alternative view on the philosophical
significance of the CBH theorem and on the role of constructive quantum
mechanical theories.4 As Bub (2004) himself notes (and in accord with his
second thesis) a certain constructive theory for quantum phenomena, namely
the collapse theory by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW) does give differ-
ent predictions from those of quantum theory. We conjecture, following Bub
(2005), that the GRW theory violates the (above) NO BIT constraint (see
below for some discussion about this point). However, the GRW theory itself
implies that this violation is compatible with everything we know empirically
about the physical world. Roughly, the NO BIT constraint implies the un-
restricted validity of the superposition principle, and in particular, it entails
that macroscopic massive systems can be in nonlocal entangled EPR–type
states even with respect to their spatial degrees of freedom. But the existence
of such macrostates has never been experimentally confirmed, so we do not
3For more on the constructive approach to special relativity see Ja´nossy (1971), Bell
(1976), and Brown (2006).
4We set aside the more general issue of the aim of physics as stated by Bub’s third
thesis. In this context it is interesting that Maxwell, although accepting the distinction
between the physics of principles and the construction of models and even admitting
that in principle indefinitely many dynamical models can explain certain phenomena,
nevertheless devoted his career almost solely to the construction of such models (Harman
2001). Einstein himself, after promoting in 1905 the distinction he borrowed from Maxwell
and Poincare´ between principles and constructions, shifted back to the constructive view
and later on abandoned what he called “the new fashion” which he himself helped creating
(Balashov and Janssen 2003).
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really know empirically whether or not such states are physically feasible.
In this paper we focus only on collapse theories as constructive alternatives
to Bub’s principle approach.5 We shall argue for the following alternative
theses.
I. No collapse quantum mechanical theories (including
information–theoretic approaches, if the latter are commit-
ted to no collapse dynamics) and alternative collapse the-
ories, such as the GRW theory are empirically distinguish-
able. This is obvious but in the present context deserves
attention.6
II. Constructive quantum mechanical theories7 are necessary to
solve the measurement problem (given the current mathem-
taical formalism of quantum theory).
III. Quantum mechanics under the information–theoretic inter-
pretation is incomplete, and moreover, it leads to inconsis-
tent predictions of the (statistical) outcomes of (some) mea-
surements.
As to Thesis II, we shall also argue that interpreting quantum mechanics as
a principle theory is not the right epistemological stance given the theoretical
basis of quantum mechanics, and that information–theoretic interpretations
of quantum mechanics as a principle theory (see Bub 2004, 2005) don’t war-
rant abandoning alternative constructive dynamical theories, in particular
theories which differ empirically from no collapse quantum mechanics. We
shall further argue that the lesson one should take from the CBH theo-
rem lies not only in the quantum phenomena that are captured by its three
5We do not address here the subtler issue of whether or not Bohmian mechanics might
be distinguished empirically from other no collapse theories such as modal and many worlds
theories and Bub’s principle approach. We agree with Bub (2005) that Bohmian mechanics
is empirically equivalent to no collapse quantum mechanics (but compare Valentini 2002).
On the other hand, questions of theory choice depend on quite complex factors and not
only on empirical content.
6There are some definite suggestions of crucial tests between the GRW theory and
standard quantum mechanics which bear on the implications of the different rates of
GRW collapses and decoherence (see Adler 2005, Adler et al. 2005, Bassi et al. 2005,
Hemmo and Shenker 2005).
7By this we include GRW–type collapse theories, hidden variables theories such as
Bohm’s and modal theories, and also many worlds theories.
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information–theoretic conditions, but also in the predictions of quantum me-
chanics, given the general validity of the CBH conditions, which up to now
remain unobserved. As to Thesis III (above), we shall argue by explicit con-
struction that the informationtheoretic approach must be supplemented by
further principles over and above those suggested by the CBH theorem. Also,
we shall argue that the notion of quantum information cannot be taken as a
primitive but rather requires (as in any other quantum theory) a quantum
mechanical analysis of measurement of the kind suggested by constructive
theories. Finally, we shall argue that a complete and consistent information-
theoretic approach is bound to rely on constructive models, mainly because
the measurement problem in quantum mechanics can only be solved by con-
structive theories; it cannot be otherwise bypassed by theories that treat
measurements as “black boxes”.
The paper is structured as follows. We briefly review in Section 2 the
CBH theorem and the purported philosophical significance Bub attaches to
it. In Section 3 we explain how the GRW collapse theory bears on the CBH
information–theoretic principles, focusing (Section 3.1) in particular on the
NO BIT principle that Bub sees as constraining any constructive model for
quantum phenomena. In Section 3.2 we argue for thesis II above, and in
particular that the issue at stake is different explanations of as yet unobserved
quantum predictions. In Section 4, we focus on the empirical inequivalence
between the constructive GRW theory and information–theoretic approaches:
we first challenge the latter with a thought experiment that establishes our
thesis III above (Section 4.1); and we consider various possible replies to
our argument in Section 4.2. Finally, in Section 5 we consider another often
stated argument against collapse theories and explain why this argument is
unacceptable.
2 The CBH Theorem and Its Philosophical
Significance
The question raised by CBH is whether we can deduce the kinematic aspects
of the quantum–theoretic description of physical systems from the assump-
tion that we live in a world in which there are certain constraints on the ac-
quisition, representation, and communication of information. CBH answered
this question positively, supplying three information–theoretic principles (so-
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called three no-go’s) that are supposed to filter out the algebraic structure
of operators and states that characterize (what they take to be) quantum
theory from the more basic structure of C∗-algebras.
The first principle, called no signaling, prohibits superluminal transfer of
information between spacelike separated systems by carrying out measure-
ments on one of them. In other words, no signaling says that measurements
(and in fact any physical manipulation) confined to a remote system cannot
possibly change the statistics of the outcomes of measurements that might
be carried out on the local system. If Alice and Bob are two physically
distinct systems,8 then when both perform local measurements, Alice’s mea-
surements can have no influence on the statistics of the outcomes of Bob’s
measurements, and conversely. This result follows from the no signaling the-
orem in quantum mechanics according to which local measurements on a
system α have no effect whatsoever on the reduced state of a remote system
β no matter what the quantum state of α+ β is. (see Ghirardi et al. 1980).
The second principle, called no broadcasting, prohibits perfectly broad-
casting the information contained in an unknown physical state.9 No broad-
casting ensures that the individual algebras A andB of the two distinct phys-
ical systems are noncommutative. As CBH show, broadcasting and cloning
are always possible for classical systems, i.e., in a commutative C∗–algebra
there is a universal broadcasting map that clones any pair of input pure states
and broadcasts any pair of input mixed states. Conversely, they show that
if any two states can be (perfectly) broadcast, then any two pure states can
be cloned; and if two pure states of a C∗-algebra can be cloned, then they
must be orthogonal. So, if any two states can be broadcast, then all pure
states are orthogonal, from which it follows that the algebra is commutative.
8Consider a composite quantum system A+B, consisting of two subsystems, A and
B. For simplicity, assume the systems are identical, so their C∗–algebras A and B are
isomorphic. The observables of the component systems A and B are represented by the
self-adjoint elements of A and B, respectively. Let A∨B denote the C∗–algebra generated
by A and B. To capture the idea that A and B are physically distinct systems, we assume
(as a necessary condition) that any state of A is compatible with any state of B, i.e.,
for any state ρA of A and ρB of B, there is a state ρ of A ∨B such that ρ|A = ρA and
ρ|B = ρB .
9In fact, for pure states, broadcasting reduces to cloning. In cloning, a ready state σ of
a system B and the state to be cloned ρ of system A are transformed into two copies of ρ.
In broadcasting, a ready state σ of B and the state to be broadcast ρ of A are transformed
to a new state ω of A+B, where the marginal states of ω with respect to both A and B
are ρ.
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In elementary quantum mechanics, on the other hand, neither cloning nor
broadcasting is possible in general.
These two principles capture two well known features of quantum the-
ory: for a composite system A+B, the no signaling constraint entails that
the C∗–algebras A and B, whose self-adjoint elements represent the observ-
ables of A and B, commute with each other (this feature is sometimes called
‘micro-causality’); and the no broadcasting constraint entails that each of
the algebras A and B is noncommutative. The quantum mechanical phe-
nomenon of interference is the physical manifestation of the noncommuta-
tivity of quantum observables or, equivalently, the superposition of quantum
states.
The third NO BIT principle prohibits communicating information in a
way that implements a given ‘bit commitment’ with unconditional security.10
In quantum mechanics Alice may send Bob, as a warrant of her bit commit-
ment, one of two mixtures associated with the same density operator (where
the mixtures correspond to alternative commitments). However, Alice may
prepare in advance a suitable entangled state, where the reduced density
operator for Bob is the same as that of the mixture she sent him. In this
case Alice would be able to steer Bob’s system nonlocally into either one of
the two mixtures (where Bob cannot be aware of this). So if there are no
restrictions on the entangled states that Alice may prepare, Alice can always
cheat Bob by pretending to have a secure bit commitment.
The NO BIT constraint prohibits unconditionally secure bit commitment
by stipulating that there are no restrictions on the preparation and stability of
entangled nonlocal states. Note that the structure that the first two principles
filter out from the general C∗–algebra still includes noncommutative theories
which are compatible with unconditionally secure bit commitment. In such
theories, it might be, for example, that although some nonlocal entangled
states (i. e., which permit remote steering) are physically possible, they turn
out to be highly unstable (over time) by the dynamical equations of motion
(say, given a non-unitary dynamics) and therefore not feasible.11 So one has
10Bit commitment is a cryptographic protocol in which, say, Alice sends an encoded bit
to Bob as a record of her commitment to either 0 or 1, which allows Bob to ascertain
Alice’s bit commitment later (only with further information supplied by Alice) so as to
make sure that her initial commitment hasn’t changed. In classical information theory
unconditionally secure bit commitment is always possible in principle.
11As noted by Bub, such a possibility in which an entangled state of a composite system
quickly decays to a mixture as soon as the component systems spatially separate was raised
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to stipulate the feasibility or dynamical stability of such states, and this is
what the NO BIT constraint does over and above the other two conditions
of no signaling and no broadcasting.12
Taking stock, the content of the CBH theorem, according to Bub (2005),
is this:
. . . [Q]uantum theories—theories where (i) the observables of the
theory are represented by the self-adjoint operators in a noncom-
mutative C∗–algebra (but the algebras of observables of distinct
systems commute), (ii) the states of the theory are represented by
C∗–algebraic states (positive normalized linear functionals on the
C∗–algebra), and spacelike separated systems can be prepared in
entangled states that allow remote steering, and (iii) dynamical
changes are represented by completely positive linear maps—are
characterized by the three information–theoretic ‘no-go’s’: no su-
perluminal communication of information via measurement, no
(perfect) broadcasting, and no (unconditionally secure) bit com-
mitment.
In order to flesh out the philosophical significance of the CBH theorem,
Bub (2005) makes use of the famous distinction between theories of principle
and constructive theories. According to this distinction (which is attributed
usually to Einstein although it already appears in the writings of Maxwell
and Poincare´),
[constructive theories] attempt to build up a picture of the more
complex phenomena out of the materials of the relatively simple
by Schro¨dinger in 1936.
12Timpson (2004, Ch. 9) argues that the NO BIT condition follows logically from no
signaling and no broadcasting, and is therefore redundant. However, in theories with non–
unitary dynamics (e. g., Schro¨dinger–type theories) some pure states in the Hilbert space
of a system (e. g., superpositions of position states corresponding to spatially separated
systems), although permissible, turn out to be dynamically unstable in the sense that they
decay extremely quickly by the equations of motion into mixed states that correspond to
classical mixtures. In this sense the NO BIT condition in a Schro¨dinger–type theory (that
satisfies no signaling and no broadcasting) might turn out to be unstably sustained for
some states. An example of a Schro¨dinger–type theory of this kind is the GRW theory. We
shall argue for our conjecture that the GRW theory does violate the NO BIT condition in
the above dynamical sense and that this is the sense relevant to Bub’s analysis in Section
3.2, and footnote 19.
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formal scheme from which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory
of gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal and diffusional pro-
cesses to the movement of molecules—i.e., to build them up of the
hypothesis of molecular motion. [Principle theories, on the other
hand,] . . .employ the analytic, not the synthetic method. The
elements which form their basis and starting point are not hy-
pothetically construed but empirically discovered ones, general
characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to
mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes
or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy. Thus
the science of thermodynamics seeks by analytical means to de-
duce necessary conditions which separate events have to satisfy,
from the universally experienced fact that perpetual motion is
impossible (Einstein 1919).
In his analysis of quantum mechanics as a principle theory, Bub appeals
to two different historical analogies where scientific progress has been clearly
achieved. In his (2004) he considers the transition from the constructive
ether-theory of Lorentz–FitzGerald to the abstract geometric formalism of
Minkowski’s spacetime and argues that the transition was only made possible
by Einstein’s principle approach to special relativity. And in (2005) Bub fo-
cuses on the transition (in the ‘opposite’ direction) from thermodynamics (as
a sort of a principle theory) to the constructive theory of statistical mechan-
ics (in the special case of the kinetic-molecular theory). In both cases Bub’s
historical analysis seems to be plausible (but these issues are under dispute;
compare Brown 2003, 2006), but we are doubtful as to the conclusions he
draws about quantum mechanics. Bub argues that the CBH theorem plays
the same role in a principle approach to quantum mechanics as the one played
by Einstein’s principle approach to relativity theory. Focusing on Bohmian
mechanics as a constructive mechanical model of quantum mechanics, Bub’s
argument consists of essentially three elements: First, in special relativity
the structure of spacetime is understood in terms of a new primitive—i. e., a
field—which is not reducible to mechanical motion (e. g., of particles relative
to the ether as in the Lorentz theory). Similarly, in quantum mechanics,
the algebraic structure of observables is to be understood in terms of a new
primitive, i. e., quantum information, not reducible to the behavior of me-
chanical systems (e. g., particle trajectories in configuration space). Second,
in both cases the principle approaches are simpler and more fruitful. In the
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case of quantum theory the CBH theorem is taken to explain away (using the
above constrains on information flow) some problematic notions in Bohmian
mechanics such as sourceless fields that guide the trajectories of particles in
configuration space (that sometimes even result in e. g., surreal trajectories
and contextual probabilities).13 At the same time the information–theoretic
approach brings out new implications of quantum mechanics such as the use
of entanglement as a possible new physical resource for quantum compu-
tation. Third, and most crucially in the present context, the constructive
mechanical alternatives to quantum theory are empirically indistinguishable
from the principle theory.
The point of Bub’s second analogy (i. e., the transition from thermody-
namics to the kinetic-molecular theory) is precisely to bring out the immense
importance of empirical distinguishability in theory choice. Here the argu-
ment is that the kinetic-molecular theory would not be regarded seriously as
an alternative constructive model for thermodynamics if (contrary to fact) it
had no new empirical predictions that differ from those of thermodynamics,
and if those predictions were not experimentally confirmed (e. g., Einstein’s
prediction of fluctuations in Brownian motion). By contrast, in the case of
Bohmian mechanics it is provable that (i) once the distribution of the par-
ticles’ positions is given by the square of the amplitude of the wavefunction
at each point (i. e., by Born-like probabilities) this distribution is preserved
at all later times by the dynamical equations of motion (see Du¨rr, Goldstein
and Zanghi 1992); and (ii) given the Born distribution, Bohm’s theory is em-
pirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. This means, in the information–
theoretic approach, that Bohm’s theory must be equivalent to quantum the-
ory if the CBH constrains on the information flow were satisfied even once
in the past (since, roughly, in a no collapse theory these constrains hold if
and only if the Born probability distribution holds). Consequently, Bohm’s
theory, quite unlike the case of Brownian motion, can yield no predictions of
‘fluctuations’ that deviate from the predictions of quantum mechanics. And
therefore, given Bub’s arguments above, the rational epistemological stance,
is to reject it, and prefer the principle information–theoretic approach.
In what follows we question Bub’s reading of the present state of affairs in
quantum mechanics. Although we largely agree with Bub’s analysis (sketched
13Here we try to flesh out Bub’s preference for a principle approach to quantum mechan-
ics over a constructive theory such as Bohm’s. Obviously, supporters of Bohm’s theory
judge surreal trajectories and contextual probabilities as unproblematic.
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above) of the features of alternative hidden variables theories, we think that
the analysis doesn’t capture all the relevant aspects related to theory choice
in the case of the present state of quantum mechanics. In particular, there
are two crucial points that seem to us not appropriately addressed in Bub’s
analysis. First, there are other constructive quantum mechanical theories
(in particular the GRW collapse theory) which generally violate the NO BIT
constraint (as a dynamically stable constraint; see Section 3.2). The GRW
theory differs in its empirical predictions from quantum theory, while it is
perfectly compatible with our experience so far. By Bub’s own standards
(see Bub 2005, Sec. 4), therefore, the GRW theory is acceptable as an alter-
native constructive theory. But adhering to Bub’s principle approach would
result in loosing sight of theories like the GRW theory on what seems like an
a–priori rather than an empirical basis. Second, information–theoretic ap-
proaches (i. e., both Bub’s principle approach and the Bayesian approach) are
incomplete, and as we said (in our thesis (III) above) need be supplemented
by further principles that are quite hard to justify (see Section 4).
On the basis of these two points we now proceed to argue for our thesis
(II), namely that constructive theories are necessary to solve the measure-
ment problem in standard quantum mechanics, and that at least partially
the issue at stake lies not in the information–theoretic description of the ob-
served quantum phenomena, but rather in the explanation of the predictions
of quantum theory which up to now remain unobserved.
3 Explaining the Unobserved
Standard no collapse quantum theory predicts the unrestrictive existence of
superpositions in spatially separated entangled states. This is tantamount
to saying, using the CBH theorem, that ex hypothesis the NO BIT princi-
ple holds in our world. But then, given this hypothesis, one question that
arises naturally is: why do superpositions remain unobserved in macroscopic
massive physical systems?
This question is in fact a variant on the so-called measurement problem
in the quantum theory of measurement. In this context the problem arises
as a straightforward consequence of applying the Schro¨dinger linear and de-
terministic dynamics to the measurement interaction. As is well known the
Schro¨dinger dynamics results for a generic measurement in a superposition
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of the form
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
µi|ψi〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉, (1)
where the kets |ψi〉 represent some suitably defined pointer states of the mea-
suring apparatus (typically, the |ψi〉 are eigenstates of the pointer position),
and the |ϕi〉 are some states of the system. The problem is that in states of
the form (1) the measurement has no definite outcome (except in the special
case where all but one of the µi are zero), since the final (reduced) state
of the apparatus cannot in general be described in terms of an ensemble of
systems in a classical mixture (in which the |µi|2 represent the probabilities
for each |ψi〉 to actually occur).
The information–theoretic approach addresses this problem by appealing
to models of decoherence in which the interaction of relatively massive sys-
tems with their environment brings about a so-called effective collapse onto
the eigenstates of some preferred observables (typically, position).14 Accord-
ing to this approach (called by Bub 1997 some years ago the ‘new ortho-
doxy’) macroscopic entangled states in position exist, but for all practical
purposes they are unobserved because we have no control over the states of
the environment, so that the reduced state of a decohering system is practi-
cally indistinguishable from a classical mixture. That this is no solution to
the measurement problem was argued in the past by many,15 including Bub
himself in the context of (constructive) hidden variables theories.16 However,
Bub seems to think that the objection does not apply to his own principle
information–theoretic approach. We disagree and will argue for this in Sec-
tion 4. But before doing so, we wish to consider here the constructive collapse
theory by GRW that gives a clear and distinct solution to the measurement
problem and explains the unobservability of macroscopic spatial superposi-
tions in the most straightforward way.
14For standard models of decoherence, see Joos et al. (2003) and references therein.
15E.g., Bell (1990), and recently Adler (2003).
16As Bub puts it in his (2000, 90–91): the fact that the ‘effective’ quantum state—an
improper mixture described by the reduced density operator (obtained by tracing out the
degrees of freedom of the environment)—is diagonal with respect to properties associated
with some pointer basis “not only fails to account for the occurrence of just one of these
[properties] but is actually inconsistent with such occurrence”, since taking into account
the environment gives us back the pure state from which the mixture was derived, and
this state is inconsistent with the occurrence of events associated with definite properties.
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3.1 The GRW theory
The GRW theory (formulated for non–relativistic quantum mechanics) ex-
plains the unobservability of some macroscopic superpositions of position
states by modifying the Schro¨dinger linear dynamics in such a way that given
the new dynamics such superpositions are overwhelmingly likely to collapse
at every moment of time, and in this sense they are highly unstable. The
Schro¨dinger equation is changed by adding to it a non-linear and stochastic
term that induces the so-called jump or collapse of the wavefunction. The
jump is supposed to occur on occasion in position space and its postulated
frequency is proportional roughly, to the mass density of the system (or in
Bell’s (1987) model on the number of particles described by the wavefunc-
tion). For our purposes it is enough to sketch Bell’s (1987) version of the
elementary and non–relativistic theory of GRW. This goes roughly as follows.
Consider the quantum mechanical wavefunction of a composite system
consisting of N particles:
ψ(t, r1, r2, ..., rN). (2)
The time evolution of the wavefunction usually (at almost all times) satisfies
the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation. But sometimes at random the wave-
function collapses or jumps) onto a wavefunction ψ` localized in position of
the (normalized) form
ψ` =
j(x− rn) ψ(t, r1, r2, ..., rN)
Rn(x)
, (3)
where rn in the jump factor j(x − rn) (which is normalized) is randomly
chosen from the arguments r1, ..., rn of the wavefunction immediately before
the jump, and Rn(x) is a suitable renormalization term. For j, GRW suggest
the Gaussian:
j(x) = K exp(−x2/2∆2), (4)
where the width ∆ of the Gaussian is supposed to be a new constant of
nature: ∆ ≈ 10−5cm.
Probabilities enter the theory twice. First, the probability that the col-
lapsed wavefunction ψ` after a jump is centered around the point x is given
by
d3x |Rn(x)|2 . (5)
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This probability distribution, as can be seen, is proportional to the standard
quantum mechanical probability given by the Born rule for a position mea-
surement on a system with the wavefunction ψ(t, r) just prior to the jump.
Second, the probability in a unit time interval for a GRW jump is
N
τ
, (6)
where N is the number of arguments in the wavefunction (i. e., in Bell’s
model it may be interpreted as the number of particles), and τ is, again, a
new constant of nature (τ ≈ 1015 sec ≈ 108 year). Note that the expression
(6) does not depend on the quantum wave function, but only on N . This is
essentially the whole theory.
For microscopic systems GRW collapses have extremely low probability
to occur, and the quantum mechanical Schro¨dinger equation turns out to be
effectively true at almost all times in just the way that no collapse quantum
mechanics predicts (and experiment confirms). However, for massive macro-
scopic systems (e. g., for systems with 1023 particles) the GRW collapses are
highly probable at all times. In measurement situations the GRW theory
implies that superpositions of macroscopically distinguished pointer states
of the form (1) collapse with extremely high probability onto the localized
states |ψi〉 on time scales that are much faster than measurement times. In
particular, the probability that the wavefunction of the composite of system
plus apparatus will stay in the superposition (1) for more than a fraction
of a second (e. g., by the time the measurement is complete) vanishes ex-
ponentially. So the GRW jumps reduce wavefunctions of the form (1) to
one of the components |ψi〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉, in which the pointer is in the localized
state |ψi〉, where the probability for a collapse onto the i-th term (see equa-
tion (5)) is given as usual by the squared amplitude |µi|2. This means that
in a sequence of quantum mechanical measurements the GRW jumps result
in definite outcomes with frequencies that are (approximately) equal to the
Born-rule probabilities |µi|2. The measurement problem is solved by this
construction as long as measurements involve a macroscopic recording of the
measurement outcome in position (e. g., a moving pointer of a measuring de-
vice, particles impinging on macroscopically separated regions of a computer
screen, etc.). Note that, and this is important for our discussion below, the
GRW jumps are designed to be extremely effective only for macroscopic su-
perpositions of position states (and to any other states that are coupled to
positions), but not to arbitrary superpositions.
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There are well known physical weaknesses in the GRW theory. In the
non–relativistic case the problem seems to be how to avoid the accumulated
violations of conservation of energy induced by the jumps.17. But perhaps the
main problem is to write down a relativistic formulation of the GRW theory.
Although GRW give the same predictions as standard quantum mechanics
with respect to the nonlocal correlations in EPR–Bell–type experiments, the
problem is that it is not clear whether in a relativistic version of the GRW
dynamics the jumps could be made Lorentz–covariant.18 Also, it has been
argued against GRW that the theory appears to be strongly ad hoc as it allows
free adjustments of constants in order to be in agreement with experiments.
Although we believe that these complaints are largely unjustified, here we
set this issue aside, because we are not concerned with the GRW theory per
se, nor with its comparison with other constructive theories. Rather, our
focus is whether Bub’s principle approach which seems to rule out the GRW
theory on the basis of information–theoretic constraints is acceptable.
3.2 Constructing the principles
How do the information–theoretic constraints of the CBH theorem bear on
the GRW theory? The first thing to say is that the GRW theory does not vi-
olate the first two constraints (i.e., no signaling and no broadcasting) because
of its stochastic dynamics (see, e. g., Gisin 1989). But, we conjecture (follow-
ing Bub 2005) that the GRW theory does violate the NO BIT principle in
the following sense. The GRW dynamics is devised in such a way that super-
positions of macroscopically distinguishable position states decay extremely
quickly by the equations of motion into the corresponding classical-like mix-
tures. Obviously, no superselection rules are introduced by the GRW theory.
That is, all the usual quantum mechanical observables are permissible in
the theory. And so any pure quantum state of any system and any entan-
gled and nonlocal state (say, of the EPR–Bell–type) in the Hilbert space of
a composite system is permissible too. In particular, one may prepare, for
example, a superposition of highly entangled spin states even for a macro-
scopic system that will be quite stable over a significant time interval (e. g.,
as in the spin–echo experiments, where the spins get, as it were, in and out
of macroscopically entangled states during an appreciable time interval; see
17See Ghirardi (2000) and references therein; Some progress is reported in Bassi et al .
(2005b)
18But see Ghirardi (2000) and Myrvold (2002).
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Hemmo and Shenker 2005). Such states are perfectly compatible with the
GRW theory and might even be quite stable over time. Moreover, two mas-
sive molecules can be made to enter with certainty a quantum state in which
their position degrees of freedom will be highly entangled as in EPR–type
states. But, given the GRW dynamics, states of this latter sort would be
highly unstable due to the extremely fast rates of the GRW jumps in posi-
tion. More generally, it is an empirical prediction of the GRW theory that
superpositions of entangled position states of spatially separated systems are
highly unstable if the systems are massive enough. Hence, the theory pre-
dicts that observable effects of such superpositions are hard to come by, and
under normal circumstances, remain unobserved.
Therefore, we conjecture, following Bub (2005), that in the GRW theory
an unconditionally secure bit commitment could always be made possible in
principle (modulo the complexity of the encryption code) via a set up that
requires Alice to encode her bit commitment in the position state of a massive
enough system (relative to the GRW parameters that fix the probability for
spontaneous localization). The NO BIT constraint is violated in the GRW
theory in the sense that spatially separated macro–systems cannot be stably
entangled in their positions. That is, in the GRW theory it is not true that for
anymixed state that Alice and Bob can in principle prepare by following some
(bit commitment) protocol, there exists a corresponding nonlocal entangled
state that can be physically and stably occupied by Alice’s and Bob’s systems.
That is, it is a straightforward consequence of the GRW dynamics that some
nonlocal entangled states are highly unstable, in the sense that these states—
although permissible in principle—decay extremely quickly to mixed states
that essentially correspond to classical mixtures). Thus we take the NO BIT
condition (following Bub 2005) as a dynamical condition on the stability
of quantum states, hence as filtering alternative quantum Schro¨dinger–type
theories such as the GRW theory.19 This, of course, is not sufficient to entail
that in the GRW theory a secure bit commitment protocol is feasible, but the
security of Alice’s protocol will depend only on the computational complexity
19Timposn (2004, ch. 9) overlooks this point. For the purpose of filtering out only
classical theories, the NO BIT condition is redundant, since it is implied (as Timpson
argues) by no signaling and no broadcasting. But to rule out GRW–type theories further
dynamical conditions are required. For this purpose the NO BIT condition seems to be
necessary and (together with the other two conditions) sufficient. Perhaps, it could be
narrowed down and translated into an empirical constraint (say, in the form of a Bell-like
inequality) for each collapse dynamics.
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of the encryption code.
However, the introduction of the unconditional NO BIT constraint into
quantum mechanics implicitly presupposes that as a matter of fact the en-
tangled states shared between Alice and Bob are states of microsystems, say,
over spin degrees of freedom. For such states we have ample experimental
confirmation that the NO BIT constraint is, indeed, satisfied. But for such
states also the GRW theory satisfies the NO BIT constraint with extremely
high probability. It violates the NO BIT constraint in the above sense only
with respect to superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable position
states. But for such macrostates also standard no collapse quantum theory
predicts an effective violation of the NO BIT constraint in the same sense
due to environmental decoherence (i. e., such states effectively collapse also
in the standard theory as all models of environmentally induced decoherence
show; see e. g., Zurek 1991, Joos et al. 2003).
So practically, no collapse quantum mechanics and the GRW theory agree
on the NO BIT constraint for all cases in which there are good empirical rea-
sons to believe it is true. And the two theories seem to disagree about the
NO BIT constraint only with respect to those macro superpositions about
which we do not know whether or not they in fact exist in our world. But of
course this is no surprise since this disagreement is located precisely where
the two theories differ in their empirical predictions. So we are back to square
one! The CBH theorem therefore provides a clear cut principle that distin-
guishes between the empirical predictions of theories of genuine collapse of
the GRW type and theories of effective collapse (as in models of environmen-
tal decoherence). But given what we know empirically about the world, there
seem to be no grounds for adopting the NO BIT principle as an unrestrictive
constraint on theory choice.20
4 Inconsistent Predictions?
We now proceed to argue for our thesis III, namely that information–theoretic
approaches to quantum mechanics are incomplete and need be supplemented
by further axioms that exceed information–theoretic principles such as those
20Note that the point made here is quite general. It would be applicable to any
information–theoretic characterization of the mathematical structure of quantum theory
(e. g., Spekkens 2004) and to any constructive alternative of it, provided the latter is em-
pirically well confirmed and not empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics.
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suggested by the CBH theorem, or by subjectivist Bayesian approaches to
quantum mechanics (see e. g., Fuchs and Peres 2000, Fuchs 2002, Caves et al.
2002, Spekkens 2004, and references therein). For convenience, we shall frame
our discussion in the context of the Bayesian approach. After presenting our
argument in the form of a thought experiment, we shall make the link to
Bub’s principle approach.
The Bayesian approach to quantum theory is based on an epistemic atti-
tude according to which the quantum state does not represent a real physical
state of a system, but instead supplies an observer with statistical information
concerning all possible distributions of measurement results. The probabil-
ities computed by the standard Born rule are understood as probabilities
of finding the system on measurement in some specific state. Applying von
Neumann’s projection postulate to the quantum state (or more generally ap-
plying Lu¨der’s rule), under this account, is just an adjustment of subjective
probabilities, conditionalizing on newly discovered results of measurement,
i. e., it is merely a change in the observer’s knowledge, or probability as-
signments. By contrast, the unitary and linear quantum mechanical dynam-
ics (i. e., the Schro¨dinger equation in the non-relativistic case) describes the
observer–independent and in this sense objective time evolution of the quan-
tum probabilities when no measurement takes place. Hence, in this approach
measurements can be treated operationally as ‘black boxes’ and require no
further theoretical analysis.
4.1 A thought experiment
We now turn to our thought experiment which is a variant on Wigner’s friend.
Consider the following set–up in which an observer A measures the z–spin
of a spin-half particle P by means of a Stern–Gerlach apparatus (which, to
keep things simple, we omit from our description below). The quantum state
of P + A initially is
|Ψ0〉 = (α|+z〉+ β|−z〉)|ψ0〉A (7)
where |α|2+ |β|2 = 1 (α, β 6= 0), the kets |±z〉 are the z−spin eigenstates and
|ψ0〉 is the initial ready state of A. After the measurement, in a no collapse
theory, the quantum mechanical state of P + A is the superposition:
|Ψ1〉 = α|+z〉|see up〉A + β|−z〉|see down〉A (8)
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where |see up〉A and |see down〉A are, say, the brain states of A corresponding
to her perceptions and memories of the two possible outcomes of the mea-
surement. By contrast, in a collapse theory of the GRW kind, the state (8) is
highly unstable (assuming that the chain of interactions leading to A’s differ-
ent memory states involves macroscopically distinguishable position states),
so that by the time the measurement is complete this state collapses onto
one of its components.
Consider now an observable Oˆ of the composite system P+A of which the
state (8) is an eigenstate with some definite eigenvalue, say +1.21 Suppose
that the composite system P+A is completely isolated from the environment,
and that a measurement of Oˆ is about to be carried out on P+A immediately
after the state (8) obtains. According to no collapse quantum mechanics the
measurement of Oˆ, under these circumstances, is completely non-disturbing
in the sense that after the measurement the state of P +A remains precisely
as in (8). One may think of Oˆ as an observable that is maximally sensitive
to whether or not the interference terms between the different components
of (8) exist. In other words, the measurement of Oˆ on P +A if the state (8)
is the true state of P +A is a non-demolition measurement that, as it were,
passively verifies whether or not P + A is in fact in that state.
Note that Oˆ commutes neither with the z−spin nor with A’s perceptions
and memories of the outcomes of the z−spin measurement. This surely raises
interesting questions about the status of the uncertainty relations in this
set up and about the reliability of A’s memories of the outcome of her spin
measurement in the event thatAmeasures Oˆ just after her spin measurement.
However, no matter what happens during the measurement of Oˆ (to A’s
memory of the outcome of her spin measurement, or to the z−spin values
themselves) quantum mechanics implies that the correlations between the
z−spin of P and A’s memories must remain exactly the same as they were
before the Oˆ–measurement. Moreover, in a no collapse theory, the state of
P+A immediately after the Oˆ–measurement will be, with complete certainty,
just:
|Ψ2〉 = α|+z〉|see up〉|see Oˆ = +1〉+ β|−z〉|see down〉|see Oˆ = +1〉 (9)
where |see Oˆ = +1〉 is the state corresponding to perceiving the result of
21Observables like Oˆ are defined in the tensor product Hilbert space HP ⊗ HA unless
superselection rules are introduced. For our purposes think of Oˆ as an observable that
pertains to P ’s spin degree of freedom and the relevant degrees of freedom of A’s sense
organs, perceptions, memory, etc.
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the Oˆ–measurement.
By contrast, in a collapse theory of the GRW kind, the state of P + A
immediately after the Oˆ–measurement will be given by one of the eigenstates
of Oˆ, where the probability that it will be state (8), and therefore that
the outcome Oˆ = +1 will be obtained, is only |α|2. Note that even if that
outcome will obtain, the state (8) will extremely quickly collapse, again, onto
one of the components of state (8) with probabilities that are given by |α|2
and |β|2. So, in the GRW theory, the final value of the z−spin and the spin
memory of A might be different before and after the Oˆ–measurement.
Note further that we deliberately do not specify here who carries out the
Oˆ–measurement (i. e., in which degree of freedom the outcome Oˆ = +1 is
recorded). It may be carried out by A or by some other observer B external
to A’s laboratory. As can be seen from our notation in (9), we have assumed
that the outcomes of A’s spin measurement and of the Oˆ–measurement are
recorded in separate degrees of freedom. Quantum mechanics imposes no
restrictions whatsoever on the way in which the outcomes of these measure-
ments are recorded, except that they cannot be recorded simultaneously in
the same degree of freedom (since σz ⊗ 1 as well as A’s memory observable
are incompatible with Oˆ). No further restrictions are imposed by quantum
mechanics (with or without collapse) on the identity of the observers who
may carry out Oˆ–type measurements (we return to this point below).22
However, consider what would happen in our scenario if A were to com-
municate her outcome to B. As long as B does not know the outcome of A’s
spin measurement, B’s predictions for the Oˆ measurement will conform to op-
tion (b) (but see below). So if A and B don’t communicate, B’s predictions
are not ambiguous (unlike A’s predictions). What about A’s predictions?
Once A communicates her spin outcome to B, A’s predictions about the
Oˆ–measurement would no longer be ambiguous, since the reduced state of
P +A after A’s communication with B would be given by the mixture corre-
sponding to the state (8) (and the total state of P +A+B would no longer
be an eigenstate of Oˆ). In fact, the predictions of A and B would coincide in
this case; that is, both A and B would predict probability of 1/2 to the out-
come Oˆ = +1. However, quantum mechanics entails the existence of other
Oˆ–type observables (e. g., any observable Oˆ2 of which the state of P +A+B
22See Albert (1983) for an extended discussion of Oˆ–type measurements and their im-
plications. Aharonov and Albert (1981) use Oˆ–type measurements in their discussion of
the collapse of the quantum state in a relativistic setting.
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immediately after the interaction of A and B is an eigenstate) with respect
to which we can run the same argument again, this time on the predictions
of both A and B. And likewise ad infinitum. But now the crucial point is
that whether or not A communicates her outcome to B becomes irrelevant.
Suppose that A doesn’t. Then, A and B differ in their predictions about the
outcome of the Oˆ–measurement. And so one of them at least must be wrong,
or so it seems.
To make things simple, let us suppose that the Oˆ–measurement is to be
carried out by the external observer B, but let us consider A’s predictions of
the probabilities of the outcomes of the Oˆ–measurement.23 Here we encounter
a problem in the information–theoretic approach since it doesn’t tell us on
what quantum state A should base her predictions. In order to calculate her
expected probabilities A may choose one of the following two options.
(a) Update her quantum state in accordance with the outcome of the spin
measurement she actually observed, either |see up〉A or |see down〉A. In
this case, she would collapse the state (8) onto one of its spin+memory
components. Applying the Born rule to this state, she will predict that
the result of the Oˆ–measurement will be +1 with probability |α|2.
(b) Ignore the outcome of the spin measurement she actually observed, and
conditionalize her probabilities on the uncollapsed state as in (8). In
this case, since the state in (8) is an eigenstate of Oˆ with eigenvalue
+1, she will predict that the result of the Oˆ–measurement will be +1
with certainty (i. e., probability 1).
But by actually performimg a series of repeated Oˆ–measurements on iden-
tically prepared systems, all in state (8), we can in principle distinguish
experimentally between the two predictions. So, on pain of inconsisteny, no
theory can accept both predictions as true.
The point to be made here, however, is that the information–theoretic
approach gives no plausible account of which option, (a) or (b), is the correct
one. On the one hand, the full information about the lab available to A
before the Oˆ–measurement is given by the collapsed state, and this implies
that option (a) is true. On the other hand if the dynamics of quantum states
is invariably given by the Schro¨dinger equation, then (assuming that this
23Clearly, in quantum mechanics the quantum state assigned to a system is supposed
to give the probabilities of the outcomes for all possible measurements.
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information is admissible to A), her predictions ought to be guided by the
uncollapsed state as in (8). And so this means that option (b) is true. And
so we seem to have a straightforwrd inconsistency.
We have formulated the above argument in terms of the Bayesian
information–theoretic approach. The link to Bub’s principle approach goes
as follows. In both approaches quantum mechanical measurements are con-
strued operationally as ‘black boxes’ with no further analysis. This is pre-
cisely the sense intended by Bub (2005, Sec. 4) of taking quantum informa-
tion as a primitive and irreducible physical concept. As argued by Bub, once
we accept the three constraints suggested by the CBH theorem, it follows
that measurements are to be treated operationally and measuring appara-
tuses as black boxes. But, any ‘black box’ theory of measurement is bound to
be incomplete in accounting for Wigner’stype scenarios as spelled out above.
Moreover, as long as the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics re-
mains intact, any operational approach that is not committed to either a
collapse–type theory or a no–collapse theory of a sort (on this point, see also
the next subsection) will necessarily run into circumstances in which the as-
signment of quantum states will become ambiguous, and as we just argued
this ambiguity will lead to inconsistent probability assignments to measure-
ment outcomes! If quantum theory is, indeed, on the right track (e.g., if there
no unknown superselection rules), then the decision between collapse and no–
collapse dynamics is forced upon us by empirical constraints. In fact, we take
this simply to mean that the measurement problem in quantum mechanics
by constructive theories24
4.2 Some resolutions
In what follows we examine various possible objections to our criticism
(above).
(I) Oˆ–type measurements are not feasible. As a matter of fact,
the Oˆ measurement is physically impossible to carry out due to decoherence
and the complexity of the set–up under consideration. As far as our best
neurophysiological theories tell us, the sensory apparatus and brain processes
of a human observer involved in typical perception and memory processes are
24This includes also the many worlds theory in all its variants. Of course, one may
interpret the NO BIT condition as a dynamical constraint, which a forteriori, implies a
no–collapse theory. But then the issue of a principle approach vs. a constructive one is
off the table. See also footnote 18.
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macroscopic and subject to continuous decoherence (induced by interactions
inand outside of the brain) that cannot be screened off. Consequently, Oˆ will
become extremely fast the wrong observable to measure in order to detect
the interference terms in states of the form of (8). Moreover, even if one
could identify the right observable to measure at a given time we cannot
expect to have control over all the relevant degrees of freedom in and outside
the observer’s brain.
Reply (I) Obviously, Oˆ–type measurements are extremely hard to carry
out and need be continuously protected against decoherence. This is much
beyond our experimental reach. In fact, even if we set decoherence aside, Oˆ–
type measurements are not quite feasible in microscopic superpositions over,
say, only spin degrees of freedom (since we need to measure total spin without
measuring the spin components separately in order for the measurement to
be non-disturbing). But ways to overcome such problems may be found. For
example, in spin–echo experiments we know today by means of macroscopic
manipulations only how to screen–off the effects of decoherence for appre-
ciable time intervals (see Hemmo and Shenker 2005). Moreover, feasibility
considerations are quite beside the point in the present context. Quantum
mechanics allows Oˆ–type measurements, and the above ambiguity must be
resolved independently of whether we can or cannot practically translate it
into an experimental context. Obviously, it may turn out that, on the basis
of some new physics, e.g., quantum gravity, the Oˆ–measurement would be
impossible in principle on pain of violating certain new physical laws, but as
far as standard quantum theory is concerned, this is not the case.
(II) Option (b) is wrong. A should stick to option (a) and use her
spin–memory eigenstate in order to calculate her probabilities (likewise for
the external observer B). By construction, the above set–up stipulates that
A carried out a measurement, and therefore from A’s point of view the state
in (8) has collapsed. As to B, although he doesn’t know which outcome A
has observed in the lab, he knows that she has carried out a measurement.
Therefore, he ought to condition his predictions on the mixture of compo-
nents in (8) rather than the full superposition. On this view the predictions
of A and B for the Oˆ measurement coincide: they both give probability of
one–half to Oˆ = +1 despite the fact that their predictions are conditional on
different quantum states.
Reply (II) The above argument is wrong–headed in the context of the
information–theoretic approach, since it seems to imply that a measurement
induces a stochastic transition from a pure to a mixed state. This, however,
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is exactly what’s argued by collapse theories which aim at constructing a
dynamical theory in which such transitions can be accounted for. To put
matters differently, option (b) cannot in general be rejected unless one is
committed to a genuine collapse theory. If the mathematical fomalism of
quantum mechanics is not changed (e. g., by adding some suitable superse-
lection rules), then given the standard ways of thinking about it, it is a fact
that no collapse theories that employ dynamics which only induces effective
collapses (somehow within the global envelope of the unitary dynamics of
the quantum state) prescribe different predictions for Oˆ–type measurements
than those of genuine collapse theories, precisley because of the difference in
their dynamical laws for the quantum state.
(III) Options (a) and (b) are compatible. Which option, (a) or
(b), will turn out to give the right predictions for the Oˆ–measurement de-
pends on who carries out the measurement, A or B. The outcome +1 of the
Oˆ–measurement is assigned probability 1 only if A carries out the measure-
ment, but probability 1/2 if B carries out the measurement. There is no
inconsistency, because the different probabilities are assigned on the basis of
incompatible quantum states (i.e. eigenstates of incompatible—maximally
non-commuting—observables) which cannot be identified with a single sys-
tem (or a single point of view). In order for the Oˆ–measurement to pick up
the interference terms, and thus yield the +1 outcome with probability 1 in
accordance with B’s prediction, the apparatus must be kept completely iso-
lated from the content of A’s laboratory. If, before the Oˆ–measurement but
just after A’s spin measurement, the apparatus gets coupled to even a single
air molecule or a photon that interacted with the z–spin measuring device or
with A’s relevant degrees of freedom, its initial quantum state will ‘split’, and
following the Oˆ–measurement it will split again relative to each component
of the state (8) exhibiting both ±1 outcomes (i. e., the ±1 outcomes will be
probabilistic). It is highly plausible due to standard decoherence effects (with
a realistic Hamiltonian) that if A carries out the measurement herself she will
have to interact with the Oˆ–apparatus, if only to switch it on, in just this
way. Therefore, there is a fundamental distinction between A–systems, i. e.,
systems that are coupled to the content of A’s laboratory, and B–systems,
i. e., systems that are not so coupled, and the probability distribution of the
outcomes of the Oˆ–measurement depends on which kind of system actually
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carries out the measurement.25
Reply (III) The above argument requires a constructive notion of an
observer or of measurement in order to make sense of the fundamental dis-
tinction between the A– and the B– systems. In this sense it does not fit a
“black-box” treatment of measurement. Here are some problems that such
a constructive view will have to resolve. First, it is not at all clear what is it
that makes the A−B distinction so fundamental? In other words, How can
a physically meaningful distinction between A– and B– systems be made on
the basis of quantum mechanics as we know it, or some other known physical
principles? For example, A might prepare in advance the Oˆ–apparatus in
its ready state, and we can just assume that the Oˆ–measurement immedi-
ately and extremely quickly follows the spin measurement. In that case, A
would be acting as a B–system, but she would also know the outcome of the
spin measurement. Second, why can’t our scenario be compatible with the
case in which A stores her memory of the spin outcome in some perfectly
isolated degree of freedom in her brain (i. e., her information is completely
private!), so that when performing the Oˆ–measurement she is actually act-
ing as a B–system? It doesn’t seem to us that physical laws as we know
them dictate that A’s information about the Oˆ–outcome need be public in
the sense that leads to decoherence. But if no restriction of this kind can be
imposed here, then the inconsistency isn’t resolved: what would be in this
case A’s predictions about an upcoming Oˆ–measurement?
(IV) Option (a) is wrong. Only the full quantum state in (8) is
the right one for conditionalization (for both A and B), because the Oˆ–
measurement involves interference between the two components of the state
in (8). A’s information about the outcome of the spin measurement becomes
completely irrelevant due to the objective (observer-independent) features
of the dynamics of the quantum state involved in the Oˆ–measurement it-
self. One might even argue that this is the ‘flipped-side’ of the uncertainty
relations: since the value of Oˆ is known in advance with certainty, A’s infor-
mation about the spin outcome is unreliable, and this is manifest by the fact
that A’s ‘memory’ of the spin value (i. e., her record observable) and Oˆ are
maximally non–commuting. Moreover, as suggested by Bub (2005, Sec. 4),
the emergence of classical information is explained only by decoherence. But,
25Note that this dependence of the actual probability distribution of the Oˆ–measurement
on the A– or B– identity is absolutely crucial. Otherwise, the probability assignments will
be straightforwardly inconsistent, as we argue above.
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by construction, the Oˆ–measurement requires recoherence of the components
in (8). Therefore, whatever information these components carry ought to be
disregarded (by both A and B) in the face of the Oˆ–measurement. Hence
option (a) is no option, and the above inconsistency is resolved.
Reply (IV) This argument, again, implicitly relies on some sort of a
constructive theory of measurement. Consider the claim that A’s memory
of her spin outcome is unreliable in the face of the Oˆ–measurement. In so
far as standard (operational) quantum mechanics goes, we are faced with a
situation in which the measurement of spin on P is followed by a measurement
of Oˆ on P +M . Since σz⊗1 and Oˆ are (maximally) non–commuting, by the
uncertainty relations, the outcomes of the spin measurement only determine
the probabilities of the outcomes of the Oˆ–measurement (in accordance with
the Born rule). That’s about all we can say in an operational “black box”
description of measurement. Whether or not A’s memories are reliable during
the measurement of Oˆ is a question that cannot be settled by a quantum
theory that treats measurements as “black boxes” nor by the CBH constrains
on information transfer. It cannot even be settled by appealing to the fact
that perceptions and memories need be modelled by decohering systems.
The above argument requires additional laws (over and above the laws of
quantum mechanics) about the dynamical behavior of A’s memory during the
interference involved in the Oˆ–measurement.26 But, strictly speaking, such
laws are nothing but laws about the behavior of hidden (or extra) variables
of a sort. And so accepting (IV) above presupposes that quantum mechanics
is incomplete.
In the above discussion we’ve tried to counter various objections to the
Oˆ–scenario. It is sometimes claimed that such a scenario is, for some reason,
26In Bohm’s theory, for example, A’s memory of the spin is perfectly reliable since the
trajectories given by Bohm’s deterministic guidance equation cannot cross each other.
By contrast, in modal interpretations where the dynamics of the extra values is stochas-
tic, A’s memory of the spin might flip during the Oˆ–measurement. Anyway, on either
theory the analysis of Oˆ–type measurements is a straightforward physical analysis, and
neither says that such measurements are unphysical or cannot be carried out, or what
have you. There is a subtle issue concerning Oˆ–type measurements in decoherence-based
many worlds theories, where the branching is defined by environmental decoherence, since
Oˆ–type measurements involve recoherence of the branches associated with A’s memories
of her spin measurement. So it is not clear whether in our scenario the branches associated
with A’s memories are well-defined, and therefore whether or how these memories might
play a role in A’s predictions (e. g., of the outcome of the Oˆ–measurement). But we go no
further on this issue here.
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excluded as a matter of principle by quantum mechanics. For example, it is
claimed that a single observer (say A) cannot carry out both the spin mea-
surement and the Oˆ–measurement, since Oˆ is an observable of P + A, and
therefore measuring it by A entails some problematic form of self-reference.
It is also claimed that because Oˆ and A’s spin memories (as we said above)
don’t commute, no single observer can ever be in a position to know (with
complete certainty) the values of both σz and Oˆ (as manifested by the un-
certainty relations). So if A knows the value of σz (as we assume) she cannot
possibly know simultaneously also the value of Oˆ. Both claims seems to take
it that quantum theory itself imposes some sort of physical constraints as to
the identity of the observers who may carry out Oˆ–type measurements, or
that Oˆ–type measurements are for some reason meaningless. Therefore, the
inconsistency of A’s predictions is somehow unphysical or cannot in principle
be revealed by a single experiment.27
However, these claims and various variants thereof are completely off the
mark in the context of our thought experiment. First, the question of whether
or not the Oˆ-scenario involves self–reference of any sort is irrelevant , since the
issue boils down in its entirety (as we presented it above) to a straightforward
question about the predictions of A as to the statistics of the outcomes of the
Oˆ–measurement—no matter who carries out the measurement ! Second, as
a matter of fact, our contraption above would involve no problematic form
of self-reference even if we were to assume that the Oˆ–measurement is to
be carried out by A herself.28 Third, standard quantum mechanics imposes
no physical constraints whatsoever on the identity of the observers who may
carry out Oˆ–type measurements. Fourth, our argument above leads to no
sort of infinite regress.29
Taking stock, by this we have established our thesis III above, namely,
that the information-theoretic approach is incomplete and that this incom-
pleteness leads to inconsistent statistical predictions. Therefore, the ap-
proach must be supplemented by further constructive laws that will remove
the inconsistency. We see no way of escaping the conclusion that Oˆ–type
scenarios require some form of a constructive theory of measurement. This
27That is, it is claimed that our argument presupposes some sort of a God’s–eye view
which, by quantum mechanics, is unavailable.
28This is essentially because we could always assume that A’s memories of the outcomes
of the spin measurement and the Oˆ–measurement are to be associated with separate
physical features of, say A’s brain. So the scenario requires no genuine self-reference.
29For a more extensive discussion of some of these issues, see Albert (1983, 1990).
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is why we believe that neither information–theoretic approaches nor “black-
boxes” approaches to quantum measurement circumvent Bell’s (1990) ob-
jection that decoherence is not enough in order to make sense of quantum
measurement—no matter whether or not ‘measurement’ is operationally con-
strued.
5 Conclusion: the Ancilla Argument
In this paper we have criticized the information–theoretic approach to quan-
tum mechanics and Bub’s ‘principle’ reading of the CBH theorem. Agreed,
the theorem remarkably demonstrates that certain salient features of quan-
tum mechanics as we know it (by empirical observation) can be expressed
very elegantly in information–theoretic terms. But it does not support any
preference to the principle view of quantum theory over its constructive coun-
terparts. Moreover (and unlike other constructive no collapse theories), our
thought experiment clearly shows that the information–theoretic approach
does not address major unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory
some of which await empirical resolution.30
More generally, the question raised by this paper boils down to the fol-
lowing. Suppose that crucial experiments that are capable of distinguish-
ing between, say the GRW theory and environmentally induced decoherence
were to come out (no kidding!) in accordance with the GRW predictions to
a very good approximation.31 Nevertheless, it is often argued that the prin-
ciple (information–theoretic) approach to quantum mechanics would remain
intact for the following reason.
Suppose that an open system S is subjected to perfect decoherence,
namely to interactions with some degrees of freedom in the environment
E, such that the environment states become strictly orthogonal. Suppose
further that we have no access whatsoever (as a matter of either physical
fact or law) to these degrees of freedom. In this case, the GRW dynamics
for the density operator of S would be indistinguishable from the dynam-
ics of the reduced density operator of S obtained by evolving the composite
quantum state of S + E unitarily and tracing over the inaccessible degrees
30See also Hagar 2003.
31For recent progress see Adler 2005, Adler et al . 2005, Bassi et al . 2005a. See also
Hemmo and Shenker 2005 for crucial experiments between collapse and no collapse quan-
tum theories testing thermodynamical effects.
28
of freedom of E. It turns out that this feature is mathematically quite gen-
eral, because the GRW dynamics for the density operator is a completely
positive linear map (see Nielsen and Chuang 2000, pp. 353-373, and Simon,
Buzek and Gisin 2001, especially fn. 14). From a physical point of view,
this means that the GRW theory is empirically equivalent to a quantum me-
chanical theory with a unitary (and linear) dynamics of the quantum state
defined on a larger Hilbert space. In other words, one could always intro-
duce a new quantum mechanical ancilla field whose degrees of freedom are
inaccessible to us, and cook up a unitary dynamics on the larger Hilbert
space that would simulate the GRW dynamics on the reduced density oper-
ator. Therefore, experimental results that might seem to confirm GRW-like
dynamics could always be re-interpreted as confirming quantum mechanical
no collapse theories on larger Hilbert spaces. In particular, such a theory
could always be made to satisfy the three CBH constraints, and thus save
the principle information–theoretic approach.
In so far as information–theoretic approaches are concerned it seems to
us that the above argument is quite premature. As the above criticism of the
ancilla argument is meant to show, it seems to us that in the current state
of quantum mechanics we are far from being able to pinpoint a principle
theory. In fact, we believe that in general a principle approach is inferior
relative to a constructive one, whenever the latter is possible.32 The ancilla
field in the above argument has, by construction, no observable effects (see,
e.g., Diosi 1989) and this amounts to introducing extra variables (or more
appropriately, a new ‘quantum ether’) into standard quantum mechanics,
whose sole theoretical role is to save some principles against (putative) em-
pirical refutation. If we are willing to accept ad hoc such an argument in the
context of non–relativistic quantum mechanics, why should we reject similar
‘ether’–like approaches in the context of relativity theory, or hidden variables
theories in the context of elementary quantum mechanics? One of the main
reasons that such latter approaches are sweepingly rejected (by information
theorists, among others) is that their complex underlying structure doesn’t
translate into new empirical predictions. But, by construction, the ancilla
field in the above argument doesn’t translate into new empirical predictions
either. Moreover, although the ancilla theory could always be made to satisfy
32This seems to be Einstein’s later view despite his introduction of special relativity as
a principle theory; see Brown and Timpson (2006) and references therein for an extended
account of this issue and of Einstein’s views on this matter.
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the three CBH principles (in particular the NO BIT condition) on the larger
Hilbert space, unconditionally secure bit commitment would in principle be
possible (in the sense spelled out in Section 3.2, in so far as our experimental
capacities are concerned (as imagined in our scenario above), via protocols
that require Alice or Bob to access the ancilla field (which ex hypothesis is
inaccessible). So, the NO BIT principle as a constraint on the feasible flow
of information in the above story becomes quite idle.
More generally, we accept that one might have good reasons to protect
unitary quantum mechanics against what would seem as a straightforward
empirical refutation. From a theoretical point of view it might turn out that
both collapse and hidden variables theories could not be made compatible
with some fundamental physical principles which we cannot give up without
giving up some significant chunk of contemporary theoretical physics (con-
servation of energy or Lorentz–covariance might be such examples).33 In that
case a protective argument of the kind suggested above might be understand-
able. But, in our view the current theoretical state of quantum mechanics
doesn’t warrant such a stance. This is mainly because although extremely
successful, quantum mechanics itself has quite deep foundational problems
not only at its most basic level (i. e., the measurement problem), but also for
example in its generalizations to both special and general relativity. In such
circumstances we believe that the right epistemological stance is to suspend
judgment and let alternative theories, such as the GRW theory, flourish.
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